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reducing contributions from 12 per-
cent to 8 percent (currently employees
contribute 6 percent of their salary
each month and employers contribute
a further 6 percent; contributions
were to be reduced to 4 percent each).
The proposed legislation would also
have reduced the amount of the fund
permitted to be invested overseas from
50 percent to 15 percent. This was
seen by many as a way to increase
political interference in the provident
fund. However, the Minister of
Finance maintained that this move
was proposed due to the need to
maintain currency stability, given that
foreign currency reserves were already
very low. The bill was withdrawn for
the midyear session of Parliament; it
resurfaced for the November session
of Parliament but was again with-
drawn. In August reports that the
provident fund was being pressured
into buying long-term government
bonds that were not of interest to
commercial banks because they were
not a good investment increased con-
cern about political interference in the
provident fund (VDP, 2 Aug 2003).
Molisa has also been involved in
internal struggles for leadership in the
Vanua‘aku Party, and some have
questioned his role in government.
The political events of 2003 have
been turbulent and many are ongoing.
For 2004 we can therefore expect to
see further developments in these
areas. However, whether Vanuatu will
settle into another period of relative
stability, or whether scandal and
changing alliances will continue to
affect politics, remains to be seen.
anita jowitt
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West Papua 
The year 2003 was marked by a pro-
liferation of erratic Jakarta politics
toward Papua and a related reconfir-
mation of the role of the Indonesian
National Military Forces (tni) in the
province. Parts of the military effec-
tively induced powerful elements in
the central government to support its
presence in Papua, on the one hand
by suggesting that there is a need to
stem secessionism, and on the other
hand by conniving at communal con-
flicts. In line with the current policy
of the Megawati government, the mil-
itary defines its role in Papua as safe-
guarding the unity of the nation and
its activities there as necessary to pre-
vent the “terrorist” acts of indepen-
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dence movements. By referring to
Papua as the second in line for seces-
sion after East Timor, elements of the
military have practically sidelined
Papua’s civil society organizations, its
intellectual elite, and significant parts
of the population that support resolu-
tions short of violence. Moreover,
since the Bali bombings in October
2002 and the explosion in front of 
the Marriot Hotel in Jakarta in
August 2003, the National Intelli-
gence Agency (bin) has positioned
itself at the forefront of the war
against terrorism and is attempting 
to take a leading role in drawing up
plans for Papua.
Positive developments were
expected to sprout from the Special
Autonomy law for Papua (Law No.
21/2001, commonly referred to as
Otsus, from its Bahasa Indonesia
name of Otonomi Khusus), which
would give more autonomy to local
communities in terms of equal sharing
of the benefits of resource extraction
and democratic governance. But these
faced a dead end after President
Megawati promulgated a decree on
the expedition of the implementation
of Law No. 45/1999 regarding the
creation of two new provinces (West
Irian Jaya and Central Irian Jaya),
three new regencies (Paniai, Mimika,
and Puncak Jaya), and one municipal-
ity (Sorong). The plan to divide the
province was actually devised in the
early 1980s by then Irian Jaya Gover-
nor Busiri Suryowinoto and Minister
of Home Affairs Supardjo Rustam.
The idea was to Papuanize the
bureaucracy, beginning at the district
level, and create six provincial levels
based on the administrative areas
demarcated by the colonial Dutch
government. The plan was shelved
largely because there were not enough
qualified locals to fill the required
positions. In 1999, the division of the
province was proposed again by the
transitional government of President
Habibie as a way to speed up the
“pemekaran” (blossoming), or admin-
istrative fragmentation, of the prov-
ince. However, the law was suspended
after sweeping resistance in Papua,
where the provincial government and
a majority of the people feared that it
would spread discord among the peo-
ple of Papua.
On 27 January President Megawati
issued the decree that raised the mat-
ter again, apparently as a result of
bin and security leaders encouraging
groups of Papuans to lobby for the
change to three provinces. The decree
was issued without consultation with
local communities, the provincial gov-
ernment, or leaders of religious and
other civil society organizations. Mal-
content Papuan political elements
were mobilized by Provincial Secre-
tary Decky Asmuruf and Brigadier
General (ret) Abraham Atururi, the
former regent of the Sorong Regency
who had lost against the current gov-
ernor, Jaap Solossa, during the elec-
tion rally in 1999. Shortly after the
decree was issued, the Ministry of
Home Affairs appointed Asmuruf as
the chair of the assistance team for
the pemekaran. During interviews
with journalists, Asmuruf made no
secret of his aspiration to become
governor of Central Irian Jaya.
Despite growing controversy over
the status of the province, the Minis-
ter of Home Affairs, Hari Sabarno,
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inaugurated Atururi as the governor
of West Irian Jaya in November,
leading to a barrage of criticism 
from Papuan leaders and people. The
Speaker of the Papua provincial legis-
lature, John Ibo, said that the inaugu-
ration contradicted a recommenda-
tion issued by the People’s
Consultative Assembly during its lat-
est annual session, recommending
that the government should revise the
law on the division of Papua. Atururi
arrived in Manokwari in February to
start work on the establishment of
new provincial headquarters. On the
way from Jakarta he stopped in Jaya-
pura to present to Speaker Ibo an
official bin statement signed by its
head, Lieutenant General (ret) Hen-
dropriyono, saying that Atururi has
the authority to establish West Irian
Jaya. According to a Manokwari-
based legal-aid organization, local
customary leaders were supporting
the creation of a new province
because the division plans would lead
to the establishment of twenty-eight
new regencies, including Teluk Bin-
tuni. The importance attached to the
creation of a separate Teluk Bintuni
regency is related to the operations of
the Tangguh liquified natural gas
plant in the area, managed by British
Petroleum. The new regency, and the
new province of West Irian Jaya of
which it is part, will be abundantly
rich in natural resources.
In Timika, the headquarters of the
other new province, Central Irian
Jaya, riots broke out when the head
of the Timika legislative council,
Andreas Anggaibak, supported by a
group called “Group of Seven Tribes,”
announced the official establishment
of the province in late August. Anggai-
bak’s alliance met with opposition
from a youth group of the Amungme
people led by Yopie Kilangin and sup-
ported by other ethnic groups in the
regions. The conflict about pemekaran
is an extension of older disputes
between the communities close to the
Freeport mining operations, relating
to the misuse of company funds and
collaboration with the military in the
region. This year’s outbreak of vio-
lence, during which five people were
killed and dozens were injured, will
not be the last until the social divi-
sions are settled through the develop-
ment of a sustainable plan for the
extraction of resources and progress
for the local communities.
For the pro-pemekaran players
in Papua the game revolves largely
around personal status, access to
the territory’s riches, and the Otsus
funds. These funds are obtained from
2 percent of the total amount of the
state budget and amounted to around
1.3 trillion rupiah (about us$15.8
million) for the 2003 fiscal year. That
the appointed governor of West Irian
Jaya also supports the implementa-
tion of Otsus makes sense in this
respect. Another possible motive for
the partitioning of Papua concerns
the role played by the military. One
inevitable consequence of the creation
of three provinces in Papua will be a
significant increase in the number of
troops in the territory. Each of the
separate provinces will have its own
regional military command (Kodam),
with its network of district and sub-
district commands (Koramil and
Korem), at a more substantial level
than presently exists. That this will
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likely create a more effective system
of repression throughout the territory
arouses the suspicion that this may
have been a major reason for dividing
Papua.
As it will take at least ten years
to get things running efficiently and
because the capabilities of newly
recruited personnel will initially be
limited, the power and quality of the
new civil administrations will be poor.
In such a situation corruption and
nepotism are likely to thrive, leading
to more disenchantment among local
people and stimulating local atrocities
as well as violent protests. This may
well pave the way for the Kodams to
virtually establish military rule, and
when necessary, impose martial law
in response to unrest. Moreover, the
National Military Forces will gain
more opportunities to raise funds
from external sources to supplement
the 30 percent of its budget that is
provided by the state. Central Irian
Jaya has the world’s largest gold and
copper mine, operated by Freeport
McMoRan. The security of the mine
has so far been under tni control,
allowing the company access to
profitable deals and virtual freedom
of movement under the Suharto
regime, and leading to an appalling
record of human rights violations.
The attempt of British Petroleum to
build trust among the local communi-
ties in the Bintuni Bay, and involve
them as stakeholders in the Tangguh
operations, appears to have prompted
elements of the armed forces to desta-
bilize the region, thereby promoting
the impression that they are needed to
safeguard the operations from
“Papuan rebels.”
The politics and controversies sur-
rounding the issue of pemekaran were
widely discussed in the national news,
generally in terms of the gradual
acceptance of the politics of chaos as
a way to gain political power and to
secure access to resources and rev-
enues. It was also argued that any
division of administrative organiza-
tion in Papua should be based on a
thorough assessment of social and
cultural realities. The focus should 
be on improving the quality and
efficiency of governance at the district
levels, and the creation of more dis-
tricts with borders that match cul-
tural, linguistic, and customary
boundaries. Otsus provides for a fair
representation of all groups in Papua
and the division plans have frustrated
those Papuans who were hoping that
a Papuan representative council
would allow local communities to
play a democratic role in the develop-
ment of their land.
Since the beginning of Megawati’s
presidency, the people of Papua seem
to have no choice but to add the
prospects of Otsus to the already
extensive history of unfulfilled prom-
ises made by Jakarta. Again, their
memories are imprinted with the fail-
ure of Jakarta in bringing social jus-
tice and opportunity to its citizens in
Papua. Instead, policies have favored
opportunities for the elite to gain
access to sources of wealth. Having
secured access to political power and
lucrative business deals, significant
numbers of the elite in Papua have
ceased to insist on further reform;
instead, they seek order and stability.
At the same time, Jakarta feels ever
freer to derail the dialogue-based
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reconciliation initiatives of Papuans
and their powerful and instructive
nonviolent responses to military-
instigated terror.
Amid significant international sup-
port for Otsus as the best available
option to curtail the conflict in Papua
and provide a better future for the
Papuans, the National Intelligence
Agency and the National Military
Forces seemed to fear that all of this
would give impetus to groups in
Papua and foreign nongovernment
organizations advocating indepen-
dence. At the same time, Jakarta sees
that the US and most European gov-
ernments are most likely to agree to 
a crackdown on the “terrorist” Free
Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua
Merdeka, or opm). In a spate of pub-
lic speeches and during official meet-
ings, military leaders and security
people used rhetoric that downgraded
the involvement of the military in ter-
rorizing Papuan communities and
emphasized the need to curtail terror-
ist activities that might destabilize the
region. For example, the protest in
Papua in early February about the
pemekaran was followed quickly by
responses of the Coordinating Minis-
ter for Political and Security Affairs,
Major General (ret) Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, among others, stating
that the international community
should stop meddling in Indonesia’s
internal affairs.
Yudhoyono’s attack was directed
against foreign researchers and non-
government organizations, particu-
larly from Australia and the Nether-
lands, who are trying to mobilize
support for the independence of West
Papua, as such individuals and groups
did in East Timor in the years before
independence was achieved there. Two
days before the end of 2002, Yudho-
yono declared that the Otsus status
accorded to Papua (and Aceh) would
be final, and any move to secede from
the country would not be tolerated.
He stated that there was no possibil-
ity for the two provinces to hold a
vote of self-determination like that
held in East Timor. Yudhoyono said
that he knew that “political elements”
from Papua had gone to many coun-
tries to get support, including the
United States, Europe, Australia, and
New Zealand. President Megawati
broached the issue of international
pro-separatist groups during a visit 
of Australian Prime Minister John
Howard in February. A few months
later Howard offered to investigate all
aid agencies working in Indonesia
using Australian government funding.
In late 2002, the national news fea-
tured I Made Pastika, named Time’s
Asian Newsmaker of the Year for his
outstanding performance in finding
the alleged perpetrators behind the
Bali bombing. Not mentioned was his
role as head of the police investigation
into the killing of two American citi-
zens and one Indonesian during an
ambush near Timika of buses trans-
porting schoolchildren of the Freeport
international school on 31 August
2002. The investigation established
convincingly that the shooting was
the work of tni Special Forces
(Kopassus), and that it appeared to 
be related to their recent struggle with
Freeport over alleged stealing of com-
pany property and demands for a
financial increase of the security deal.
With Pastika busy heading the investi-
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gation into the Bali bombing, Papua
lost an unusually daring head of
police and there was a risk that the
spotlight would come off the terrorist
actions of Kopassus.
Nevertheless, Indonesia came
under pressure from the United States
because of the Timika ambush. In
mid-January 2003, Nancy Spier,
whose husband Rich Spier was killed
during the ambush, lobbied US
administration and congressional
representatives to halt the Interna-
tional Military Education and Train-
ing (imet) funding. Spier claims there
is evidence that the Indonesian mili-
tary was behind the ambush. Con-
gress had first voted to restrict imet
funds for Indonesia in response to the
12 November 1991 Santa Cruz mas-
sacre in East Timor. All military ties
were severed in September 1999 as
the Indonesian military and its militia
proxies razed East Timor following
its pro-independence vote. Spier’s
campaign contributed positively to
the discussion and the decision to sus-
pend the funding for the training.
Further information emerged in
March about one of the possible
motivations for tni involvement in
the ambush—to pressure the mining
company to keep up protection pay-
ments to the military. A leaked report
prepared for Freeport shareholders
revealed that the company had paid
over us$11 million to the army over
the last two years as part of this
extortion racket. Previously the com-
pany had admitted to making a one-
off payment of us$37 million to
establish a military base camp but
denied making regular payments.
US legislators were obviously
concerned about being seen to be
completely indifferent to the possible
murder of two US citizens. On 16
July, the House of Representatives
amended the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for 2004–2005 to
bar imet funding for Indonesia until
it is certified that Indonesia is taking
effective measures to investigate and
prosecute those responsible for the
Freeport murders. In late 2003, the
US Congress approved us$4 million
for the Indonesian military for coun-
terterrorist training. Early in 2004
there was talk about a joint police
and military inquiry into the Timika
ambush, which would be conducted
in cooperation with the fbi. How-
ever, during the fbi’s initial efforts to
investigate, tni officials would not let
soldiers in Papua be interviewed with-
out superiors present or permit the
fbi to conduct forensic tests on evi-
dence. It was only after Washington
linked military assistance to coopera-
tion that the fbi was allowed to bring
home some evidence for analysis. It
was widely discussed in international
media that by focusing primarily on
terrorism the United States is progres-
sively committing a political blunder
in Indonesia. It is much more impor-
tant to assist the Indonesian govern-
ment and Indonesian civil society in
building democratic institutions, as
well as revitalizing the economy and
the educational system.
This year saw both the departure
and the full-swing return of Kopassus.
Kopassus withdrew from Papua after
investigations revealed that twelve
Kopassus members were behind the
brutal assassination of Papuan leader
Theys Hiyo Eluay in November 2001.
At the farewell ceremony in late Feb-
ruary, the tni provincial chief, Major
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General Mahidin Simbolon, stated
that the team would not be replaced,
considering the stable security situa-
tion in Papua. The trial of Kopassus
members in relation to the killing of
Eluay began on 3 January. Right after
the beginning of the trial, military
commander General Endriartono
Sutarto maintained that a separatist
group in Papua had been struggling
to establish a public perception that
the military was involved in a series
of violent acts. On the same occasion,
Indonesian National Police Chief
General Da’i Bachtiar said that the
police had always been impeded by
gunshots during investigation of vio-
lent crime scenes in Papua. In April,
the military court in Jakarta found
seven Kopassus soldiers guilty of
involvement in the death of Eluay
and imposed relatively light prison
sentences ranging from two to three-
and-a-half years. These light sen-
tences sent the message to the people
of Papua that it is still very hard for
them to receive justice.
On 4 April, the military command
post Kodim 1702 in the central high-
land district of Jayawijaya was
attacked by what the military quickly
reported to be a group of opm rebels.
Some ten people seized twenty-nine
m-16 machine guns, pistols, and a
significant amount of ammunition.
Two soldiers and one of the attackers
died during the attack. Within a few
days, Brimob (the mobile brigade of
the police) and Kopassus troops from
military headquarters in Jakarta were
sent to Wamena for intensive military
investigation. The raid of the Kodim
office provided a clear excuse for
Kopassus to return to Papua. Soon
after the return of Kopassus, senior
tni officials admitted publicly that
soldiers may have been involved in the
attack on the Kodim armory. Even so,
the military response to the Kodim
ambush was harsh. After a few days,
the military commander for Papua,
Brigadier General Nurdin Zainal,
announced that the operation would
continue until all the missing weapons
were found. Within five days they
recovered nineteen weapons, but the
operation continued. Toward the end
of April, nine staff members of the
military office in Wamena were trans-
ferred to the Kodam in Jayapura in
connection with their involvement in
the incident. So far, excessive verdicts
have been passed on the “opm”
weapon thieves and thirteen “opm
leaders” in Wamena who were sud-
denly arrested and some of them were
secretly transferred to the court in
Jakarta. The Jayapura-based military
command alleged that only a few
houses had been burned during the
operation because they were used as
hiding places for opm members.
An ad hoc team called Coalition,
consisting of ngo workers and people
from religious organizations, was set
up to monitor the case and to provide
legal aid to the arrested. They encoun-
tered great difficulties in getting
access to the region and in being able
to visit and talk to the detained. In
late May, the military in Wamena
managed to intimidate seven wit-
nesses to withdraw incriminating
statements they have made in their
testimony to the Coalition. At the
same time, two members of the Coali-
tion were interrogated by the military
without having been charged. Never-
theless, in the months following the
attack on the Kodim armory, the
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Coalition was able to confirm a spate
of communications about burning of
tens of houses; destruction of villages
(most notably the village of Kwiya-
wagi in the Kuyawage district); rape
of women; indiscriminate killing of
men; and over a thousand people
seeking refuge in Tiom, Ilaga, and
Mulia. Moreover, the Coalition’s
lobby toward the Indonesian Human
Rights Commission (Komnas ham)
and regular calls from leaders of reli-
gious groups in Papua resulted in the
formation of an investigative team in
mid-July that was scheduled to com-
mence its investigations in August. It
took until January 2004 before it was
officially announced that a Komnas
ham team would begin to probe
human rights violations in Papua.
Over the course of the year, it
became increasingly difficult for
human rights and legal aid organiza-
tions to conduct their work freely, in
an atmosphere of ongoing harassment
and intimidation. On 29 December
2002, the Jakarta Post reported that
unidentified men shot four women,
including Elsie Rumbiak Bonay, the
wife of Joanis G Bonay, director of
the Papua-based Institute for 
Human Rights Study and Advocacy
(elsham). The shooting happened
near an immigration post close to the
Indonesia–Papua New Guinea border.
The police failed to hold an on-site
investigation after gunmen fired at a
joint police-military convoy heading
for the site of the shooting. Two mili-
tary personnel were wounded in the
attack. National newspapers reported
that the head of the Kodam believed
that Mathias Wenda, a prominent
opm member, was responsible for the
shootings. elsham speculated that
the attack against Bonay’s wife might
be related to the human rights group’s
recent accusation that the military
was behind the August 2002 Freeport
ambush. In June 2003, the new tni
military commander, Major General
Nurdin Zainal (who replaced
Brigadier General Simbolon, reas-
signed to the army’s command in
Jakarta because of his links to the
Timika attack) proceeded with a
lawsuit against elsham regarding 
the organization’s initial findings in 
its investigation into the Timika
shooting. Since then, elsham work-
ers, legal aid activists, and their rela-
tives have increasingly received
threats in connection with their state-
ments to the media regarding the
Timika and Eluay cases.
The behavior of the military led to
tensions and stress among local com-
munities, and throughout the year,
many people where forced to surren-
der as opm members. These surren-
ders were then reported by the mili-
tary as the results of their persuasive
approach. While the 2002 Freeport
shooting appears to be related to con-
cerns over the security deal between
Kopassus and the mine, the Wamena
case highlights the perverse coopera-
tion between elements of the Free
Papua Movement and the security
forces. The regional command struc-
tures of Kopassus have seemingly
unlimited power to terrorize local
communities.
Toward the end of 2003, Papua-
based newspapers speculated exten-
sively about another strategy pursued
by the military to exert control over
Papua, reminiscent of the dynamics 
of the violence that victimized major
parts of East Timorese society for
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decades. After some two years of
unrest in Papua over the establish-
ment of the Laskar Jihad militia in
the towns of Sorong and Fak-fak, fur-
ther rumors circulated about the mili-
tary helping to establish bases for
militias. These were provoked by the
reports that a former East Timor mili-
tia leader, Eurico Guterres, planned
to set up a nationalist youth group
called Front Pembela Merah Putih
(Red and White Defenders Front) in
Timika, and news about the appoint-
ment of a new chief of police for
Papua, Timbul Silaen, who had been
police chief in East Timor during
1998–1999. Guterres worked along-
side Silaen in East Timor and was
convicted of committing crimes
against humanity in East Timor. He
has been sentenced to ten years but
is not yet imprisoned, as his appeal
is pending. Silaen was accused but
cleared of a range of crimes in East
Timor. 
The proliferation of militias is
nothing new in Indonesia. The New
Order regime under President Suharto
made systematic use of civilian mili-
tias. While it may have been a stan-
dard counterinsurgency tactic, the
result was deeper polarization of
society in troubled areas, and less
accountability on the part of the gov-
ernment. Youth paramilitary groups
including Pemuda Pancasila and Ban-
teng Pemuda (the latter is now
headed by Guterres and is affiliated
with Megawati’s pdi Perjuangan, or
“Democratic Party of Struggle”) were
formed to mobilize against political
opposition on behalf of the ruling
party, Golkar. These groups set a
precedent for the proliferation of mili-
tias after Suharto fell. The problem is
that previously they all answered to
Suharto and Golkar; now they answer
to a host of different officials and
entities at all levels of society.
It is unclear whether the Front
Pembela Merah Putih is set up to
control the direct presidential election
on 5 July 2004 and the election for
legislators on 5 April. However, the
buildup to the elections will likely be
used by the military as an excuse to
increase its vigilance in areas that it
can present to Jakarta as vulnerable
to disruption by rebels. There are
numerous tensions that can be trig-
gered into conflict, perhaps the most
vulnerable being the widespread
opposition to pemekaran. People
opposed to this administrative frag-
mentation are generally politically
apathetic or support Golkar, while
the supporters of pemekaran, includ-
ing immigrants, business people, and
certain bureaucratic elites, support
Megawati’s pdi Perjuangan or vari-
ous Muslim parties. By late 2003,
the friction had increased markedly
between the Papuan Regional General
Elections Commission (kpud) and the
General Elections Commission in
Jakarta (kpu) about the appointment
of a secretary to the kpud provincial
chapter in West Irian Jaya to verify
legislative candidates in the newly
formed province. The government
of Papua in Jayapura has accused
the kpu of being infected with gov-
ernment interests, as acting governor
Atururi has required all legislative
candidates to accept the new province
of West Irian Jaya, even though the
province is not mentioned in the
Election Law.
The majority of people in Papua
are generally not interested in the
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elections. They sense the interference
of the central government and see that
it has no political commitment to
solve the prolonged conflict with
Papua. In both national and provin-
cial newspapers, critical observers
have noted that the elections could
turn violent in Papua if political
parties supporting pemekaran are
defeated. This could provide a con-
venient legitimization for the military
to flex its muscles, which in all proba-
bility will lead to violations of human
rights, most likely in the highland
region of Jayawijaya and locations
along the border with Papua New
Guinea. In any case, the disconnect
between Papua and Jakarta will
widen. Government leaders and
national policymakers increasingly
tend to rely on information they
receive from intelligence reports pro-
duced by a variety of sources with
questionable interests, generally con-
veying an exaggerated picture of what
is happening in Papua.
The unrelenting position of the
Indonesian government with respect
to carrying Otsus into effect; the
pressing ahead with the formation of
two new provinces; and the scarcely
legitimate and disproportionate mili-
tary operation in Wamena all bluntly
signal the government’s inclination
toward foolhardiness, violence, intim-
idation, and injustice. Not surpris-
ingly, many Papuans feel that the pre-
vious Suharto-led New Order regime
has made a comeback and is again
frustrating their often moderate aspi-
rations. The difference from five years
ago is that corruption and nepotism
are now decentralized, with numerous
Papuan leaders playing a part in a
system that effectively rewards people
who seek opportunities to redeem
past grievances for cash.
This year was characterized by
increasing military aggression, a fur-
ther crippling of the provincial gov-
ernment, and an avalanche of aston-
ishment among the people of Papua
about Jakarta’s lack of consideration
for the concerns of the people and 
its ignorance of the reasons behind
Papuan resentment. Ironically, certain
elements in Jakarta who claim to be
defending the territorial integrity of
the Indonesian Republic, by their
actions actually strengthen the seces-
sionist movement, both national and
international. Developments in 2003
have again shown that Jakarta’s con-
duct toward Papua falls woefully
short of the standards Papuans are
entitled to expect from a government
that claims to follow the Pancasila-
established principles of democracy
and pluralism. This bodes ill for the
still viable social basis in Papua that
supports a peaceful solution through
dialogue and increased sovereignty. 
jaap timmer
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